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Introduction
On January 22, 2013, Tarik “Terry” Dehko sat down to pay the bills for
his small Michigan grocery store when a federal agent entered his office.1
The agent told Dehko that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) had executed
a seizure warrant and taken the market’s entire bank account—more than
* J.D., December 2014, University of Michigan Law School. Thank you to University of
Michigan Law School Professors Nicholas Bagley, Richard Friedman, Samuel Gross, David
Moran, and A.C. Pritchard; the Institute for Justice, especially Clark Neily and Larry Salzman;
and the Michigan Law Review team, especially Megan DeMarco, Sommer Engels, Brian Howe,
Danielle Kalil-McLane, Daniel Montgomery, Emma Notis-McConarty, Joel Pratt, Jessica Roll,
Ryan Rott, Jennifer Stone, and the talented and dedicated Executive Editors of Incorporation,
Daniel Halainen and Edward Mroczkowski.
1. See Claimants’ Motion for Prompt Post-Seizure Hearing and Return of Property at 2,
United States v. $35,651.11 in U.S. Currency, No. 4:13-cv-13118 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 25, 2013)
[hereinafter Dehko Motion for Prompt Post-Seizure Hearing]; Terry Dehko, Commentary,
Bullied by the IRS, Wash. Times, Sept. 26, 2013, at B1, http://www.washingtontimes.com/
news/2013/sep/26/dehko-bullied-by-the-irs/print/.
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$35,000.2 When Dehko asked how he could run his business without its
bank account, the agent replied, “I don’t care.”3
The government did not charge Dehko with a crime that day.4 In fact,
Dehko had never been charged with any crime in his life.5 Instead, the gov-
ernment waited until July 19 to bring a civil forfeiture action against
Dehko—ninety-one days after Dehko filed a claim with the IRS asserting his
property interest in the seized money.6 During that time, Dehko could not
access those funds to pay his employees, rent, utility bills, or vendors. For
the first time, Dehko was late on his payments.7
The government’s action alleged that Dehko violated federal structuring
law.8 Federal law establishes reporting requirements for bank deposits over
$10,000.9 But the law also bans “structuring” deposits—making more than
one deposit arising from the same transaction in amounts less than $10,000
to avoid the reporting requirement.10 The ban prevents both money laun-
dering and spreading profits from criminal enterprises.11 But Dehko had a
legitimate business reason for regularly depositing less than $10,000 into his
business’s bank account: like many small businesses, the grocery’s insurance
policy limited cash losses to $10,000 out of risk.12 Thus Dehko did not need
to report his deposits, because he was not “structuring.”13 On top of that,
the IRS had examined Dehko for potential structuring violations just nine
months earlier and concluded that “no violations were identified.”14 Ulti-
mately, the government voluntarily dismissed the forfeiture action against
Dehko on November 15.15 But not without harm to Dehko and his market.
2. Dehko Motion for Prompt Post-Seizure Hearing, supra note 1, at 2; Dehko, supra
note 1.
3. Dehko, supra note 1.
4. Dehko Motion for Prompt Post-Seizure Hearing, supra note 1, at 2.
5. Id.; Dehko, supra note 1.
6. Dehko Motion for Prompt Post-Seizure Hearing, supra note 1, at 2.
7. Id. at 4–5; Dehko, supra note 1.
8. Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition to Claimant’s Motion for Prompt Post-Seizure
Hearing and Return of Property at 1–3, United States v. $35,651.11 in U.S. Currency, No.
4:13-cv-13118 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 9, 2013) [hereinafter Government’s Response] (citing 31
U.S.C. § 5324 (2012)).
9. Bank Secrecy Act, 31 U.S.C. § 5313(a) (2012); 31 C.F.R. § 1010.311 (2014).
10. 31 U.S.C. § 5324.
11. See Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 144 & n.11 (1994) (noting purposes of
§ 5324).
12. Dehko Motion for Prompt Post-Seizure Hearing, supra note 1, at 3; Dehko, supra
note 1.
13. Dehko Motion for Prompt Post-Seizure Hearing, supra note 1, at 3.
14. Id. Ex. 4 (letter from IRS to Dehko Foods, Inc).
15. Press Release, Inst. for Justice, IRS Backs Down: Michigan Forfeiture Cases Volunta-
rily Dismissed (Nov. 15, 2013), http://ij.org/michigan-civil-forfeiture-release-11-15-2013. By
contrast, the government insists that it dismissed the action because it filed the forfeiture
complaint too late. Dehko v. Holder, No. 13-14085, 2014 WL 2605433, at *1 (E.D. Mich. June
11, 2014).
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Law enforcement seized Dehko’s bank account through civil forfeiture.
Civil forfeiture statutes authorize the government to seize and keep property
it suspects is involved in criminal activity, without prosecuting an underly-
ing offense.16 Forfeiture proceedings are technically in rem actions against
property, not its owner.17 To join the lawsuit, the owner must file a claim
opposing forfeiture and asserting her interest in the property, or else forfeit
the property.18 This process is similar to intervention in a civil suit. The
alleged conduct used to justify the forfeiture—here, structuring—is crimi-
nal. But civil forfeitures are civil: the higher burdens of criminal proceed-
ings, like proof beyond a reasonable doubt, do not apply.19 The government
can seize and keep property without ever securing a criminal conviction in
the related offense.20
Terry Dehko is not alone: many others face cash seizures by the IRS for
alleged structuring. Months after Dehko’s seizure, the IRS seized $33,244.85
from Mark Zaniewski, the owner of a gas station in Michigan.21 As a result, a
vendor refused to supply gasoline, causing the station to close for two weeks.
Zaniewski then had to assign receipts directly to the supplier and pay a
higher rate due to his newly bad credit.22 The same year, the IRS seized the
16. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 981 (2012) (federal general civil forfeiture statute); 21 U.S.C. § 881
(2012) (federal drug trafficking civil forfeiture statute). This Note focuses on one particular
issue in federal general civil in rem forfeiture: procedural due process for civil forfeitures of
currency seized for alleged structuring. In addition to federal civil forfeiture statutes, forty-
seven states and the District of Columbia have laws providing for civil in rem forfeiture. Dee
R. Edgeworth, Asset Forfeiture: Practice and Procedure in State and Federal
Courts 9–10 tbls. 1, 2 & 3 (3d ed. 2014). See generally Marian R. Williams et al., Inst. for
Justice, Poli¢ing for Profit: The Abuse of Civil Asset Forfeiture (2010), http://ij.org/
images/pdf_folder/other_pubs/assetforfeituretoemail.pdf (grading the civil forfeiture laws of
all fifty states).
17. See infra note 50. In an in rem suit, a party brings an action against a piece of
property rather than against its owner. For this reason, civil forfeiture cases often have names
like United States v. One-Sixth Share of James J. Bulger in All Present and Future Proceeds of
Mass Millions Lottery Ticket No. M246233, 326 F.3d 36 (1st Cir. 2003), United States v. Real
Property Located at 1 Mile up Hennessey Road, No. 2:09-cv-1940-GEB-KJM, 2010 WL 456922
(E.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2010), United States v. Approximately 600 Sacks of Green Coffee Beans Seized
from Cafe´ Rico, Inc., 381 F. Supp. 2d 57 (D.P.R. 2005)—or, in Dehko’s case, United States v.
$35,651.11 in U.S. Currency Seized from PNC Bank Account Number XXXXXX6937, Dehko
Motion for Prompt Post-Seizure Hearing, supra note 1.
18. See infra Section I.A.
19. Edgeworth, supra note 16, at 8; Williams et al., supra note 16, at 6; cf. 18 U.S.C.
§ 982 (federal general criminal forfeiture statute); 18 U.S.C. § 1963(b) (federal Racketeer In-
fluenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act criminal forfeiture statute); 21 U.S.C. § 853
(federal narcotics criminal forfeiture statute).
20. Edgeworth, supra note 16, at 8; Williams et al., supra note 16, at 9 (“Under this
power, it is not necessary for the government to demonstrate that a property owner is guilty of
criminal misconduct. Indeed, civil forfeiture can take place even when criminal charges are
never filed against a property owner.”).
21. Claimant’s Motion for Prompt Post-Seizure Hearing and Return of Property at 2–3,
United States v. $33,244.86 in U.S. Currency, No. 13-13990 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 14, 2013) [here-
inafter Zaniewski Motion for Prompt Post-Seizure Hearing].
22. Id. at 4.
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$33,000 checking account of Carole Hinders, the owner of a cash-only res-
taurant in Iowa, after she deposited less than $10,000 into the account.23 The
IRS also seized a $66,000 account from Army Sgt. Jeff Cortazzo, who, on the
advice of a bank teller, made several sub-$10,000 deposits into a safe-deposit
box to save for his daughter’s college education.24 There, the government
settled—at a $21,000 cost to Cortazzo. That settlement caused his daughter
to delay college for a year.25
Current seizure practices extend well beyond anecdote. The government
regularly seizes cash without prosecuting the underlying structuring offense.
While IRS seizures for alleged structuring increased fivefold over seven years,
to 639 seizures in 2012, law enforcement criminally prosecuted only one in
five cases.26 The overenforcement of seizures, notwithstanding the underp-
rosecution of alleged structuring, can be expected when an agency has a
direct pecuniary interest in the assets seized.27 In many cases, local law en-
forcement can spend assets however it chooses: officers can not only start a
new college savings fund from Sgt. Cortazzo’s old one, but can buy sports
cars28 or even a margarita machine for the office.29 In the case of federal
seizures, seized assets go into a dedicated fund that supplements the agency’s
budget, further encouraging civil forfeiture.30
These forfeiture practices led to increased media scrutiny, from the
Washington Post to comedian John Oliver, which pressured executive branch
agencies to change their policies.31 After a New York Times investigation, the
23. Dick M. Carpenter II & Larry Salzman, Inst. for Justice, Seize First, Ques-
tion Later: The IRS and Civil Forfeiture 16–17 (2015), http://ij.org/images/pdf_folder/
private_property/seize-first-question-later.pdf; Shaila Dewan, Law Lets I.R.S. Seize Accounts on
Suspicion, No Crime Required, N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 2014, at A1, http://www.nytimes.com/
2014/10/26/us/law-lets-irs-seize-accounts-on-suspicion-no-crime-required.html?_r=0.
24. Dewan, supra note 23.
25. Id.
26. Carpenter & Salzman, supra note 23, at 12 tbl.2, 15 tbl.4.
27. Margaret H. Lemos & Max Minzner, For-Profit Public Enforcement, 127 Harv. L.
Rev. 853, 895–98 (2014) (explaining that more enforcement is a consequence of an agency’s
pecuniary interest in the assets seized); see also id. at 868–70 (discussing asset forfeiture). For
an explanation of the government’s pecuniary interest in civil forfeiture, see infra text accom-
panying notes 152–159.
28. Shaila Dewan, Police Use Department Wish List when Deciding Which Assets to Seize,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 2014, at A12, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/10/us/police-use-depart-
ment-wish-list-when-deciding-which-assets-to-seize.html?_r=0.
29. Last Week Tonight with John Oliver: Civil Forfeiture (HBO television broadcast Oct. 5,
2014), http://www.hbo.com/last-week-tonight-with-john-oliver/episodes/01/20-october-5-
2014/video/ep-20-clip-civil-forfeiture.html?autoplay=true.
30. The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 created the Assets Forfeiture Fund.
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 310, 98 Stat. 1837, 2052
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 524(c) (2012)). The Act requires the Attorney General to report the
revenue from forfeiture of property enforced by the U.S. Department of Justice. 28 U.S.C.
§ 524(c)(6) (2012).
31. E.g., Dewan, supra note 23; Robert O’Harrow Jr. & Michael Sallah, They Fought the
Law. Who Won?, Wash. Post, Sept. 9, 2014, at A1, http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investi-
gative/2014/09/08/they-fought-the-law-who-won; Sarah Stillman, Taken, New Yorker, Aug.
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IRS announced it would no longer seize and seek forfeiture of funds in sus-
pected structuring cases “unless there are exceptional circumstances justify-
ing the seizure and forfeiture.”32 And, after a congressional subcommittee
hearing,33 the Department of Justice (DOJ) announced a new policy requir-
ing prosecutors to develop probable cause for additional federal criminal
activity, subject to supervisor approval, before seizing property.34
But the policy changes do not eliminate the overenforcement problem.
First, the policies do not change existing law. The IRS announcement, for
example, insists that structuring is itself illegal and does not define “excep-
tional circumstances,” reserving the IRS’s right to seize property in structur-
ing prosecutions.35 In a congressional subcommittee hearing investigating
IRS seizures in structuring cases, the IRS commissioner apologized for seiz-
ing assets from innocent people, but insisted that IRS agents followed the
law.36 Despite the policy change, prosecutors still waited a month and a half,
and even held a deposition, before dropping the forfeiture case against Car-
ole Hinders.37 Moreover, future agency leadership could simply change the
policies and return to seizing property without prosecuting for structuring.
Second, the agencies’ pecuniary interests remain.
Other than waiting for a civil forfeiture trial to play out, claimants have
few options to challenge the government’s continued control of their prop-
erty when it comes to cash assets. That control is real: on average, civil for-
feitures for structuring take more than a year after the seizure.38 Both Dehko
12, 2013, at 48, http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/08/12/taken; Last Week Tonight
with John Oliver, supra note 29.
32. Statement of Richard Weber, Chief of I.R.S. Criminal Investigation, N.Y. Times (Oct.
25, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/26/us/statement-of-richard-weber-chief-of-irs-
criminal-investigation.html?_r=0.
33. See Press Release, H. Comm. on Ways and Means, Ways and Means Oversight Forces
DOJ Response on Civil Asset Forfeiture (Apr. 2, 2015), http://waysandmeans.house.gov/ways-
and-means-oversight-forces-doj-response-on-civil-asset-forfeiture/.
34. Memorandum for Heads of Dep’t Components U.S. Attorneys from Attorney Gen.
Eric Holder, Guidance Regarding the Use of Asset Forfeiture Authorities in Connection with
Structuring Offenses (Mar. 31, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-re-
leases/attachments/2015/03/31/ag-memo-structuring-policy-directive.pdf. The new DOJ pol-
icy also requires a prosecutor to direct an agency to return seized money if the prosecutor does
not have enough admissible evidence in a civil or criminal trial and imposes a 150-day dead-
line for filing charges against the seized money. Id. But current law, see infra Part I, already
requires the government to bring an action against the seized money within ninety days after a
property owner files a claim opposing forfeiture. Thus, while the policy could provide new
help for the many property owners who never file civil forfeiture actions, it leaves current law
unchanged for those who do file.
35. See Statement of Richard Weber, Chief of I.R.S. Criminal Investigation, supra note 32.
36. Rachael Bade, IRS Under a Spotlight for Freezing Assets, Politico (Feb. 11, 2015, 8:01
AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/02/irs-under-a-spotlight-for-freezing-assets-115091
.html.
37. Shaila Dewan, I.R.S. Asset Seizure Case Dropped by Prosecutors, N.Y. Times, Dec. 13,
2014, at A34, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/14/us/irs-asset-forfeiture-case-is-dropped-
.html?_r=0.
38. Carpenter & Salzman, supra note 23, at 18.
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and Zaniewski filed motions for prompt postseizure hearings and return of
property before the government voluntarily dismissed the civil forfeiture ac-
tions against them.39 In Zaniewski’s case, the government dismissed the case
one day after Zaniewski filed.40 After the dismissals, Dehko and Zaniewski
sought declaratory judgments for postseizure hearings in federal court in
case the government executed seizure warrants for the same conduct in the
future.41 Because they already had control of their cash by that time, the
court dismissed their claims as moot.42
Cash seizures for alleged structuring, as compared to other crimes, are
particularly worrisome. Not only can the government seize and keep cash
with a low burden of proof, but innocent conduct often underlies structur-
ing cases because a person can make several sub-$10,000 deposits for legiti-
mate reasons.
This Note argues that the temporary deprivation of cash warrants in-
creased due process protection and should thus be analyzed under the Ma-
thews v. Eldridge balancing test for civil due process. Part I walks through
current forfeiture procedure from the perspective of an owner of seized cash,
elucidating the burdens that owners face in real practice.43 It concludes that
the process a claimant of seized cash must follow is inadequate, potentially
exposing federal law to a due process challenge. Part II argues that the depri-
vation and detention of cash for alleged structuring violates due process.
Applying Mathews in structuring cases, the strong private interest in cash—
an owner’s most important asset for essential payments or running a busi-
ness—will ultimately outweigh the government’s interest in avoiding addi-
tional procedures. Part III considers possible reforms by each branch of
government, ultimately offering a judicial remedy. It concludes that—unless
Congress amends federal law to provide better procedural alternatives for
claimants of seized cash—due process demands postseizure hearings under
Mathews for cash seizures in structuring cases.
I. Inadequate Pretrial Procedures
This Part examines how the federal government can seize and keep cash,
and what owners can do about it. The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of
39. Dehko Motion for Prompt Post-Seizure Hearing, supra note 1; Zaniewski Motion for
Prompt Post-Seizure Hearing, supra note 21.
40. Zaniewski filed a Motion for Prompt Post-Seizure Hearing and Return of Property
on November 14, 2013. Zaniewski Motion for Prompt Post-Seizure Hearing, supra note 21.
The next day, the government voluntarily dismissed the case. Plaintiff’s Unopposed Motion for
Voluntary Dismissal of Its Complaint, United States v. $33,244.86 in U.S. Currency, No. 13-
13990 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 15, 2013).
41. Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Dehko v. Holder, No. 13-
14085 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2013).
42. Dehko v. Holder, No. 13-14085, 2014 WL 2605433 (E.D. Mich. June 11, 2014).
43. Cf. Howard E. Williams, Asset Forfeiture: A Law Enforcement Perspective
(2002).
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2000 (CAFRA)44 significantly amended federal civil forfeiture laws. CAFRA’s
proponents sought to reform the civil forfeiture process by increasing pro-
tections for property owners.45 Reforms included, for example, time limits
for the government to provide notice and file forfeiture actions, an inno-
cence defense, and hardship exemptions.46 But CAFRA’s critics continue to
assert it does not go far enough to protect property owners.47
In particular, CAFRA includes fewer protections for cash seizures than
for seized physical property.48 CAFRA creates a maze of claims, petitions,
motions, and requests for the diligent claimant to exercise her rights and
contest her money’s seizure. Section I.A evaluates claims opposing forfei-
ture. Section I.B considers petitions for remission or mitigation. Section I.C
discusses motions to return property. Section I.D evaluates hardship release.
At least one commentator argues that, due to other protections for property
owners—notice and filing deadlines, the innocence defense, and hardship
exemptions—CAFRA “may not be as vulnerable to a due process chal-
lenge.”49 But as demonstrated infra, these “protections” are inadequate for
cash seizures and leave CAFRA open to a due process challenge under the
framework discussed in Part II.
A. Claim Opposing Forfeiture
Civil forfeiture is typically an in rem procedure against a piece of prop-
erty, not its owner.50 A federal agency need not file a forfeiture action to
44. Pub. L. No. 106-185, 114 Stat. 202 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the
U.S. Code).
45. For example, in his first year as chairman of the U.S. House of Representatives Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, U.S. Representative Henry Hyde published a book advocating for civil
forfeiture reform. Henry Hyde, Forfeiting Our Property Rights: Is Your Property Safe
from Seizure? (1995).
46. 18 U.S.C. § 983(a), (d), (f) (2012); see also Edgeworth, supra note 16, at 68–69, 105,
175–77.
47. David Pimentel, Forfeitures Revisited: Bringing Principle to Practice in Federal Court,
13 Nev. L.J. 1, 23–32 (2012) (surveying criticisms of CAFRA); see also Jordan Richardson,
Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Goes Mainstream, Issue Brief (Heritage Found., Wash. D.C.),
Nov. 17, 2014, at 3, http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2014/pdf/IB4301.pdf (discussing con-
gressional proposals for ending equitable sharing and increasing the government’s burden of
proof).
48. Many forms of physical property other than money are subject to forfeiture. See 18
U.S.C. § 981(a)(1) (listing property subject to forfeiture).
49. Edgeworth, supra note 16, at 107.
50. For the history of civil forfeiture and its development as an in rem procedure, see
Leonard W. Levy, A License to Steal: The Forfeiture of Property 7–20, 39–61 (1996),
and Donald J. Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard, Civil Forfeiture and the War on Drugs: Lessons from
Economics and History, 33 San Diego L. Rev. 79, 93–98 (1996). In tracing the origins of civil
forfeiture law, both sets of authors begin with deodand, an object (such as a knife, pistol, or
runaway carriage) forfeited to the English Crown on the theory that the object caused a per-
son’s death. Levy, supra, at 7–20; Boudreaux & Pritchard, supra, at 94. But Professors Bou-
dreaux and Pritchard note that modern American forfeiture law descended not from deodand,
but from admiralty forfeitures in the seventeenth-century Navigation Acts. Boudreaux &
Pritchard, supra, at 94–95 (citing Michael Schechter, Note, Fear and Loathing and the Forfeiture
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seize property. Instead, the federal general civil forfeiture statute allows a
federal agency like the IRS to seize property with a seizure warrant.51 The
agency asks for a seizure warrant in the same manner as a search warrant: in
an ex parte proceeding before a federal magistrate to determine probable
cause that property is subject to forfeiture.52 The property owner has no
right to a hearing before the seizure, and thus cannot challenge it on that
basis.53 CAFRA does, however, impose notice requirements for seizures. The
seizing agency has sixty days from the date of the seizure to provide written
notice to all parties potentially interested in the property.54 Even under
CAFRA, the seizing agency can retain seized property for two months with-
out notifying the owner.
Only after receiving notice may owners take their first actions to reclaim
seized cash. First and foremost, an owner should file a claim opposing the
forfeiture.55 CAFRA also subjects owners to deadlines: an owner must file a
claim opposing forfeiture within thirty-five days after the seizing agency
mails a notice letter or within thirty days after final publication of the no-
tice.56 In an IRS seizure, if no claim is timely filed, the IRS will sell seized
property without declaring a forfeiture.57 After filing the claim, the property
owner becomes the claimant. In this sense, filing a claim in opposition to a
forfeiture is like intervening in an in rem suit against the property.58
By filing a claim opposing forfeiture, however, the claimant preserves
only her right to a judicial determination of the forfeiture. To try to reclaim
the seized property, the owner must go through a potentially long, expensive
trial.59 The deprivation of property for several months surely harmed
Dehko, Zaniewski, Hinders, and their businesses, though the government
voluntarily dismissed the forfeiture claims against them without even going
Laws, 75 Cornell L. Rev. 1151, 1154 (1990); then citing James R. Maxeiner, Note, Bane of
American Forfeiture Law—Banished at Last?, 62 Cornell L. Rev. 768, 772 (1977)). For an
analogy of early American admiralty and customs forfeiture laws to cash civil forfeitures, see
infra note 174.
51. 18 U.S.C. § 981(b)(2). The statute also provides exceptions to the warrant require-
ment. An arrest warrant in rem allows seizure after the government files a forfeiture claim in
federal court. Id. § 981(b)(2)(A). In addition, the statute provides for seizure without a war-
rant much like criminal searches and seizures: the government may seize if it has “probable
cause to believe that the property is subject to forfeiture” and the government seized the
property “pursuant to a lawful arrest or search” or “another exception to the Fourth Amend-
ment warrant requirement.” Id. § 981(b)(2)(B).
52. See id. § 981(b)(2); see also United States v. Approximately 600 Sacks of Green Coffee
Beans Seized From Cafe´ Rico, Inc., 381 F. Supp. 2d 57, 60, 63–64 (D.P.R. 2005).
53. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 679–80 (1974).
54. 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(1)(A)(i).
55. See id. § 983(a)(2)(A).
56. Id. § 983(a)(2)(A)–(B).
57. 26 U.S.C. § 7325(4) (2012).
58. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 (intervention).
59. See supra text accompanying note 38.
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to trial. Moreover, a trial contains its own risks. Litigation could draw atten-
tion, leading to a criminal prosecution, and could expose the claimant to
civil discovery, including depositions.60 To try to reclaim property post-
seizure but pretrial, the claimant must look to other strategies.
B. Petition for Remission or Mitigation
In addition to filing a claim opposing the forfeiture, the property owner
may seek administrative relief outside of trial by submitting a petition for
remission or mitigation. Remission refers to the complete release of the
seized property, while mitigation refers to something less: returning some,
but not all, of the property.61 Remission and mitigation were intended to
alleviate the harshness of seizure and forfeiture.62 But both options fail to
adequately protect owners from cash civil forfeitures because the procedures
lack procedural safeguards.63 Moreover, a property owner can lose her right
to a full judicial determination if she files only for remission and neglects to
file a claim opposing the forfeiture as well.64
Customs laws provide the statutory authority for remission or mitiga-
tion,65 but each seizing agency has its own regulations governing the proce-
dure.66 For example, the IRS requires that an owner file a petition for
remission or mitigation within three months after the IRS sells or disposes
of the property seized.67 The DOJ, on the other hand, advises “any persons
who may have a present ownership interest” to file petitions within thirty
days after receiving a seizure notice.68 But as previously discussed, owners
must file claims opposing the forfeiture within thirty-five days of a notice
letter’s mailing.69 Thus, if a property owner only files a petition for remis-
sion or mitigation, or waits to hear the result of that petition, she will miss
the deadline to file an opposition in the trial. The owner then loses the right
to a judicial determination. An owner may, however—and probably
60. 1 David B. Smith, Prosecution and Defense of Forfeiture Cases ¶ 6.02(3)(a)
(2015).
61. See Edgeworth, supra note 16, at 72 (discussing eligibility for remission or mitiga-
tion under DOJ regulations).
62. 2 Smith, supra note 60, ¶ 15.01 (“The reach of the civil forfeiture laws, in particular,
would be intolerable were it not for the fact that administrative relief is available to innocent
persons whose property is used by others for criminal purposes.”).
63. Cf. Willis v. United States, 787 F.2d 1089, 1094 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that due
process does not require hearings on remission petitions).
64. See Edgeworth, supra note 16, at 71; 1 Smith, supra note 60, ¶ 6.02(3).
65. 19 U.S.C. § 1618 (2012).
66. E.g., Treas. Reg. §§ 403.35–.45, .50 (2015) (IRS); 28 C.F.R. §§ 9.1–.9 (2014) (DOJ,
including the FBI, Drug Enforcement Administration, and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Fire-
arms, and Explosives).
67. Treas. Reg. § 403.39.
68. 28 C.F.R. § 9.3(a).
69. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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should—file both a claim opposing forfeiture and a petition for remission or
mitigation.
But administrative relief is not easy to secure. DOJ’s criteria for granting
remission or mitigation are phrased in the negative: “the ruling official shall
not grant remission of a forfeiture unless” the owner meets the criteria.70
Even then, DOJ retains discretion to withhold relief.71 This discretion is es-
pecially precarious for cash seizures. Under DOJ regulations, the seizing
agency presumes the validity of the seizure and may not consider the suffi-
ciency of the evidence to support the forfeiture.72 Many agencies are “very
likely to deny the petition regardless of whether there is any evidence to
show that the money is tainted.”73 In addition, a petitioner has no right to a
hearing.74 Moreover, judicial review of the agency’s administrative determi-
nation is very limited and is usually confined to review of the process rather
than the merits.75 Thus, a petition for remission or mitigation remains “a
matter of administrative grace.”76
In sum, features of the remission or mitigation process—including the
agency’s discretion, absence of a hearing, and limited judicial review—limit
protections for owners in cash seizures, especially when agencies are particu-
larly likely to deny petitions involving seized cash. Therefore, the ability to
seek a petition for remission or mitigation is unlikely to dispel a due process
challenge.
C. Motion to Return Property
In limited circumstances, a claimant can challenge the continued deten-
tion of seized cash by filing a motion to return property. Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 41(g) provides for that motion, originally intended to
challenge an unlawful seizure.77 In 1989, Congress extended the rule to cover
any “deprivation of property,” including seizures for civil forfeiture.78 The
motion requires the government to show probable cause that the property is
subject to forfeiture at the time of the motion hearing—not at the time of
70. 28 C.F.R. § 9.5(a)(1). A petitioner must establish a “valid, good faith, and legally
cognizable interest in the seized property” and “the basis for granting a petition.” Id.
§ 9.5(a)(1), (3).
71. See id. § 9.5 (providing minimum criteria for petitioners including establishing inno-
cence); 2 Smith, supra note 60, ¶ 15.02(2)(i).
72. 28 C.F.R. § 9.5(a)(4).
73. 2 Smith, supra note 60, ¶ 15.02(2)(e).
74. 28 C.F.R. § 9.3(g).
75. See 2 Smith, supra note 60, ¶ 15.03.
76. 1 Smith, supra note 60, ¶ 6.02(3).
77. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(g).
78. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 41 advisory committee’ notes on 1989 amendments; see also 1
Smith, supra note 60, ¶ 10.05A (explaining the 1989 amendments). The advisory committee
notes refer to Rule 41(e); in 2002, Rule 41(e) was amended to become Rule 41(g). 1 Smith,
supra note 60, ¶ 10.05A.
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the seizure. If the government cannot meet that burden, it must return the
property to the movant.79
Perhaps paradoxically, the time limits CAFRA sets for the government
to file civil forfeiture actions have largely gutted Rule 41(g)’s protections.80
CAFRA created time limits to benefit property owners by limiting long
seizures by the government.81 As a result, courts have less time to grant mo-
tions to return property before the government files a civil forfeiture action.
Instead, the claimant must seek relief in the trial itself.82 Today a court will
only grant relief under Rule 41(g) before the government files a forfeiture
action or if the government detains property after the filing deadline. After
the government files the forfeiture action, the claimant must use motions to
dismiss and for summary judgment to secure early release of the property.83
These motions require time and resources, bringing innocent claimants
deeper into litigation.
D. Hardship Release
Claimants have one last opportunity to secure pretrial return of seized
property: hardship release. CAFRA created a new provision that entitles
claimants to “immediate release of seized property” pending the outcome of
the trial.84 But hardship release—one of the safeguards that supposedly
makes CAFRA less vulnerable to a due process challenge85—specifically ex-
empts seized cash from eligibility for release.86 CAFRA provides five criteria
for hardship release: (1) a possessory interest in the money; (2) sufficient ties
to the community; (3) substantial hardship; (4) that the hardship “out-
weighs the risk that the property will be destroyed, damaged, lost, concealed,
or transferred”; and (5) that no condition in paragraph (8) applies.87 At first,
these criteria seem to apply to claimants of seized cash like Dehko, Zaniew-
ski, and Hinders. But paragraph (8) provides that “[t]his subsection shall
not apply if the seized property . . . is . . . currency . . . unless such currency
. . . constitutes the assets of a legitimate business which has been seized.”88 In
79. 1 Smith, supra note 60, ¶ 10.05A.
80. See 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(3)(A) (2012) (requiring the government to bring a civil forfei-
ture action within ninety days after the owner files a claim opposing forfeiture); supra notes
45–46 and accompanying text.
81. See supra notes 45–46.
82. See, e.g., United States v. U.S. Currency $83,310.78, 851 F.2d 1231, 1235 (9th Cir.
1988) (“[W]hen a civil forfeiture proceeding is pending, there is no need to fashion an equita-
ble remedy to secure justice for the claimant.”). Before CAFRA, Rule 41(g) “was used to force
the government’s hand to file the forfeiture case.” Edgeworth, supra note 16, at 103.
83. 1 Smith, supra note 60, ¶ 10.05A.
84. 18 U.S.C. § 983(f) (2012).
85. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
86. 18 U.S.C. § 983(f)(8)(A).
87. See id. § 983(f)(1)(A)–(E).
88. Id. § 983(f)(8)(A). The Senate added criteria for hardship release as part of an
amendment to the House bill at the DOJ’s request:
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other words, courts will not order the release of seized cash unless the gov-
ernment seized all assets of the business.89 If not all assets of a business have
been seized—like Dehko’s grocery store, Zaniewski’s gas station, or Hin-
ders’s restaurant themselves—hardship release is unavailable.
In short, the options for an owner of seized cash to reclaim the property
before trial are limited. In some cases—like remission or mitigation, and
hardship release—safeguards exist for seizures of other property, but not
cash. And preserving the right to a judicial determination of a forfeiture or a
motion to return property cannot provide relief until the end of the trial.
Accordingly, courts have started to take a harder look at due process in civil
forfeiture. Given the current law, due process requires greater protections for
claimants.
II. Due Process for Cash Seizures in Structuring Cases
This Part builds on CAFRA’s different treatment for seized cash than
other property to explain how due process requires protecting seized cash in
structuring cases. Section II.A lays out the current governing framework and
argues that courts now apply the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test even to
temporary deprivations of an increasingly wide range of property. Section
II.B collects the factors that courts consider in Mathews balancing in these
cases and applies them to cash seizures. This Part concludes that cash
seizures in structuring cases merit due process protection under Mathews.
A. Due Process in Civil Forfeiture
The current governing framework for due process in civil forfeiture pro-
vides preseizure hearings for deprivations of real property, postseizure hear-
ings for deprivations of vehicles, and perhaps postseizure hearings for
deprivations of cash as well. The Supreme Court has recognized the right to
a hearing “at a meaningful time”90 for the deprivation of property, but that
standard does not guarantee a hearing before the government seizes
property.91 In fact, the Court has never explicitly held a right to a pre-92 or
Unlike H.R. 1658, the substitute adopts the primary safeguards that the Justice Depart-
ment wanted added to the provision—that property owners must have sufficient ties to
the community to provide assurance that the property will not disappear, and that cer-
tain property, such as currency and property particularly outfitted for use in illegal activ-
ities, shall not be returned.
146 Cong. Rec. 3656 (2000) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy). This Note evaluates the gov-
ernment’s interest infra Section II.B.3.
89. E.g., Kaloti Wholesale, Inc. v. United States, 525 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1070 n.2 (E.D.
Wis. 2007).
90. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972) (holding that state replevin statutes violated
the Fourteenth Amendment by denying the right to a hearing before goods’ seizure).
91. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 679–80 (1974).
92. See id.
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postseizure hearing93 in civil forfeiture. Rather, in civil forfeiture cases, gov-
ernment interests—preventing the continued illicit use of cash, enforcing
criminal law, and preventing the movement, concealment, and destruction
of cash—counsel against preseizure hearings because they warn owners
about coming enforcement actions.94
Under current case law, courts apply the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing
test to weigh the competing private and government interests in civil forfei-
ture cases.95 In Mathews, George Eldridge challenged the termination of his
social security disability benefits without a hearing.96 The government ar-
gued that the decision to terminate benefits was an objective determination
made in accordance with valid administrative procedures.97 The Court con-
sidered three factors based on precedent: (1) the private interest affected, (2)
the risk of erroneous deprivation, and (3) the government interest, including
the burden of implementing new procedures.98 After weighing the three fac-
tors, the Court concluded that, although Eldridge raised a colorable claim,99
he was not entitled to a hearing before the termination of his disability
benefits.100
The Court first applied Mathews balancing to civil forfeiture of real
property in United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property.101 In 1985,
James Daniel Good pleaded guilty in Hawaii state court to violating state
drug law after the police uncovered eighty-nine pounds of marijuana and
$3,187 in cash.102 Four years later, in an ex parte proceeding, the United
States argued that probable cause existed that Good’s home and land were
subject to forfeiture due to their role in violating federal drug law. To make
their case, however, federal agents relied on the search by Hawaii police four
years earlier.103
93. See United States v. $8,850 in U.S. Currency, 461 U.S. 555, 569 (1983) (enumerating
means by which a property owner could commence civil forfeiture proceedings).
94. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 679.
95. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 53 (1993). Until Good,
the Court applied the Sixth Amendment right-to-speedy-trial test to evaluate a property
owner’s claim of a Fifth Amendment deprivation of property—and held no constitutional
violation occurred. $8,850, 461 U.S. at 564. Justice Stevens dissented: “[i]n my opinion a rule
that allows the Government to dispossess a citizen of her property for more than 18 months
without her consent and without a hearing is a flagrant violation of the Fifth Amendment.” Id.
at 570 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
96. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 324–25 (1976).
97. Id. at 325.
98. Id. at 335.
99. Id. at 331–32.
100. Id. at 349.
101. 510 U.S. 43, 52–53 (1993).
102. Good, 510 U.S. at 46.
103. Id. at 46–47.
468 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 114:455
Due to the interests implicated by a dwelling, the Court required
preseizure hearings before agents could seize Good’s home.104 Under Ma-
thews balancing, the “right to maintain control over [the] home, and to be
free from governmental interference, is a private interest of historic and con-
tinuing importance.”105 The ex parte seizure creates an “unacceptable risk”
of erroneous deprivation.106 And the government’s interest in ensuring that
property is not destroyed or concealed is low for real property.107 Thus, ab-
sent exigent circumstances, the government must provide “notice and a
meaningful opportunity to be heard before seizing real property subject to
civil forfeiture.”108
After Good, courts have applied the Mathews balancing test to determine
if postseizure hearings are required for temporary deprivations of property
other than homes. In the vehicle context, the answer has been yes.109 In
Krimstock v. Kelly, the Second Circuit, in an opinion by then-Circuit Judge
Sotomayor, required a “prompt postseizure retention hearing” for vehicles
seized in connection with a New York City driving-while-intoxicated viola-
tion.110 The court’s holding is particularly noteworthy because it protects
seizures of vehicles in civil forfeiture, even as the Fourth Amendment pro-
vides fewer protections for vehicles than for homes.111 Thus the decision
supports broader protections for seizures in civil forfeiture under Fifth
Amendment due process than under Fourth Amendment searches and
seizures. Applying Mathews balancing, the Second Circuit reasoned that the
private interest in vehicles was “particular[ly] importan[t]” because vehicles
are “use[d] as a mode of transportation and, for some, the means to earn a
livelihood.”112 Moreover, city code provided no exemption when seizures
“would cause particular hardship.”113
A district court reached a similar conclusion in Simms v. District of Co-
lumbia.114 There, the District charged Frederick Simms with weapons viola-
tions and seized his vehicle as an instrumentality, but waited until six
104. Id. at 62.
105. Id. at 53–54 (first citing Fourth Amendment cases United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705
(1984); then citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980)).
106. Id. at 55.
107. Id. at 58–59.
108. Id. at 62.
109. Smith v. City of Chicago, 524 F.3d 834 (7th Cir. 2008), vacated as moot sub. nom
Alvarez v. Smith, 558 U.S. 87 (2009); Krimstock v. Kelly, 306 F.3d 40 (2d Cir. 2002)
(Sotomayor, J.), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 969 (2003); Simms v. District of Columbia, 872 F. Supp.
2d 90 (D.D.C. 2012).
110. Krimstock, 306 F.3d at 68–69.
111. See, e.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (upholding warrantless
searches of vehicles because of their mobility); see also California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386
(1985) (treating mobile homes as vehicles rather than homes for searches).
112. Krimstock, 306 F.3d at 61.
113. Id.
114. Simms, 872 F. Supp. 2d at 100–04, 107.
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months after his acquittal to initiate a civil forfeiture action.115 The district
court analyzed the case much like the Second Circuit had. The court granted
Simms’s preliminary injunction, prohibiting the District from holding
Simms’s car without giving him an opportunity to be heard, pending the
outcome of the civil forfeiture action.116
Finally, the Seventh Circuit also required a prompt postseizure hearing
to test the validity of the continued retention of a seized vehicle—and
cash—in Smith v. City of Chicago.117 The case is especially interesting for two
reasons. First, the Seventh Circuit required a postseizure hearing for a
seizure of both the vehicle and cash.118 As in Krimstock, the court noted the
strong private interest in vehicles.119 Second, the Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari and heard oral argument.120 Before argument, however, both sides
confirmed that the case had settled.121 The Court held the case moot and
declined to rule on the merits, eliminating an opportunity to address the
extent of due process in civil forfeiture.122 A decision affirming the Seventh
Circuit would have required prompt postseizure hearings to test the contin-
ued deprivation of personal property like vehicles and cash as a constitu-
tional matter.
B. Due Process Balancing for Cash Seizures
To determine whether depriving owners of their property violated due
process, the courts in Good, Krimstock, Simms, and Smith balanced three
Mathews v. Eldridge factors: (1) the private interest affected, (2) the risk of
erroneous deprivation, and (3) the government interest, including the bur-
den of implementing new procedures.123 These concerns are particularly dif-
ficult to balance when the property is cash: liquid cash can be a person’s
most valuable asset, yet it is also the easiest to destroy or conceal. This Note
argues that in structuring cases the strong private interest in cash outweighs
the government’s interest, particularly because the availability of postseizure
hearings undercuts the government’s strong interest in avoiding preseizure
hearings.
115. Id. at 91–92.
116. Id. at 100–04, 107.
117. 524 F.3d 834 (7th Cir. 2008), vacated as moot sub. nom Alvarez v. Smith, 558 U.S. 87
(2009).
118. Smith, 524 F.3d at 838.
119. Id.
120. Alvarez v. Smith, 558 U.S. 87, 89 (2009).
121. Id. at 92. The City of Chicago returned three vehicles to plaintiffs; two plaintiffs
defaulted on claims to cash seized by the city; and the city returned by agreement some, but
not all, cash to a final plaintiff. Id.
122. Id. at 94.
123. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
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1. Private Interest Affected
The strong private interest in homes and vehicles also applies to cash.
First, as then-Judge Sotomayor noted in Krimstock, “[t]he deprivation of real
or personal property involves substantial due process interests.”124 In particu-
lar, vehicles are “central to a person’s livelihood or daily activities”125—even
though vehicles are treated differently than homes for Fourth Amendment
searches and seizures.126 The Seventh Circuit agreed in Smith: “The private
interest involved . . . is great. . . . The hardship posed by the loss of one’s
means of transportation . . . can result in missed doctor’s appointments,
missed school, and perhaps most significant of all, loss of employment.”127
And even in the case of the home, the Supreme Court in Good added an
economic consideration into Mathews balancing: Good rented out the
house, so the rent he received weighed in favor of a private interest.128 The
second justification that applies in the cash context is the “availability of
hardship relief under the applicable law.”129 In Krimstock, New York City
code made no provision for particular hardship caused by retention of a
seized car.130 Third, “the length of deprivation . . . increases the weight of an
owner’s interest in possessing the vehicle.”131
Smith, perhaps most on point, adds a note of caution about procedural
difficulties when the personal property is cash. Considering the possibility of
posting bond to return physical property like a vehicle, the Seventh Circuit
added, “[t]he person from whom cash is seized also has a strong interest in a
hearing, though obviously the posting of a cash bond for cash is an absurd-
ity.”132 While it may be absurd to post a cash bond for the release of cash
pending the outcome of a civil forfeiture action, there are other options.
CAFRA gives courts broad authority to enter orders preserving property’s
availability for trial, including restraining orders or appointing receivers,
conservators, or other custodians.133 While courts appear reluctant to use
such a resource-intense remedy, they could appoint a receiver—a judicially
124. Krimstock v. Kelly, 306 F.3d 40, 61 (2d Cir. 2002) (emphasis added) (first citing
United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 53–54 (1993); then citing id. at 81
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); then citing Connecticut v. Doehr, 501
U.S. 1, 11 (1991); and then citing Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 70–71 (1972)).
125. Id. at 44.
126. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
127. Smith v. City of Chicago, 524 F.3d 834, 838 (7th Cir. 2008), vacated as moot sub nom.
Alvarez v. Smith, 558 U.S. 87 (2009).
128. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 54 (1993) (“[R]ent
represents a significant portion of the exploitable economic value of [the claimant’s] home.”).
129. Krimstock, 306 F.3d at 61.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Smith, 524 F.3d at 838.
133. 18 U.S.C. § 983(j)(1) (2012).
December 2015] Due Process for Cash Civil Forfeitures in Structuring Cases 471
appointed custodian over another’s property—pending the outcome of pro-
ceedings to oversee claimants’ legitimate business use of the cash.134 That
process, however, would be unlikely to satisfy due process.135 As then-Judge
Sotomayor emphasized, “the importance of the claimant’s possessory inter-
est post-seizure and pre-judgment is not diminished by the likelihood that
the government will eventually prevail in forfeiture proceedings.”136
For claimants like Dehko, Zaniewski, and Hinders, the private interest in
liquid cash is especially great:137 it serves as the “means to earn a liveli-
hood.”138 After the IRS seized the bank account of Dehko’s grocery store,
Dehko had no funds to pay employees, rent, utility bills, or vendors.139 And
after the IRS seized the bank account of Zaniewski’s gas station, his checks
bounced and his vendors charged higher rates.140 The retention of cash had
real consequences for Dehko, Zaniewski, and Hinders, from harming their
credit to creating a risk of bankruptcy or loss of the goodwill of their enter-
prises. In addition, seized-cash claimants’ interests are heightened, because
alternate procedures like hardship release are unavailable for seized cash.141
Moreover, the government deprived Dehko, Zaniewski, and Hinders access
to their cash for around the same length of time as in Simms, when the court
allowed the owner access to his property.142 In sum, in considering the first
Mathews factor, procedural difficulties cannot diminish claimants’ otherwise
strong interest in hearings testing the retention of seized cash.
2. Risk of Erroneous Deprivation
In a due process analysis, “[t]he particular deprivation with which we
are concerned . . . is the . . . post-seizure, pre-judgment retention”143 of cash.
The risks of erroneous deprivation generally fall into three categories: (1)
lack of protections for innocent owners, (2) the government’s pecuniary in-
terest in forfeiture, and (3) the value of additional protections. For cash
seizures, the risks of erroneous deprivation of cash weigh in favor of owners.
134. Id.
135. See United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 54–55 (1993) (“The
practice of ex parte seizure . . . creates an unacceptable risk of error.”).
136. Krimstock v. Kelly, 306 F.3d 40, 62 (2d Cir. 2002).
137. Cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970) (holding that a recipient’s interest in
uninterrupted welfare payments, which “provide[ ] the means to obtain essential food, cloth-
ing, housing, and medical care,” outweighed government interests and required an opportu-
nity to be heard).
138. Cf. Krimstock, 306 F.3d at 61 (retention of vehicles).
139. Dehko Motion for Prompt Post-Seizure Hearing, supra note 1, at 4; Dehko, supra
note 1.
140. Zaniewski Motion for Prompt Post-Seizure Hearing, supra note 21, at 4.
141. See supra Section I.D.
142. See Simms v. District of Columbia, 872 F. Supp. 2d 90, 91–92 (D.D.C. 2012).
143. Cf. Krimstock, 306 F.3d at 62 (retention of vehicles).
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First, courts must protect innocent owners from erroneous depriva-
tion.144 Congress “did not intend to deprive innocent owners of their prop-
erty.”145 Yet the innocence defense CAFRA established for  trials146 is
probably not enough, because “the ultimate judicial decision . . . that the
claimant was an innocent owner . . . ‘would not cure the temporary depriva-
tion that an earlier hearing might have prevented.’ ”147 Courts have also ex-
pressed concern for net present value: “an owner cannot recover the lost use
of a vehicle by prevailing in a forfeiture proceeding. The loss is felt in the
owner’s inability to use a vehicle that continues to depreciate in value as it
stands idle in the police lot.”148 Thus the current “ex parte preseizure pro-
ceeding affords little or no protection to the innocent owner.”149
The risk of depriving innocent owners of property pending the outcome
of a civil forfeiture trial is especially high in structuring cases because the
government so rarely pursues criminal trials. Even though IRS seizures tied
to structuring increased fivefold from 2005 to 2012, the government ulti-
mately prosecuted only one in five as a criminal structuring case.150 For ex-
ample, Dehko, Zaniewski, and Hinders all lost access to their bank accounts
for months, only to have the government voluntarily dismiss the suits
against them.151
Second, an adversarial hearing is “of particular importance here, where
the Government has a direct pecuniary interest in the outcome of the pro-
ceeding.”152 The government’s strong pecuniary interest in cash civil forfeit-
ures increases incentives to seize cash from innocent owners. Civil forfeiture
has become big business for government budgets.153 Federal law encourages
the government’s pecuniary interest through a process called “equitable
sharing,” by which the federal government shares the proceeds of assets with
assisting state and local law enforcement agencies.154 This pecuniary interest
can be expected to increase the number of forfeitures—and the size of for-
feitures—pursued.155 Indeed, Congress created the Assets Forfeiture Fund,
144. See id. at 55–56 (citing United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43,
55 (1993)).
145. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 55 (1993) (pointing to
an innocence defense in the federal narcotics forfeiture statute).
146. 18 U.S.C. § 983(d) (2012).
147. Good, 510 U.S. at 56 (quoting Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 15 (1991)).
148. Simms v. District of Columbia, 872 F. Supp. 2d 90, 103 (D.D.C. 2012) (quoting
Krimstock, 306 F.3d at 64).
149. Good, 510 U.S. at 55.
150. Dewan, supra note 23.
151. Dewan, supra note 37; Press Release, Inst. for Justice, supra note 15 .
152. Good, 510 U.S. at 55–56.
153. See Williams et al., supra note 16 (describing how law enforcement benefits from
civil forfeiture); see also Samuel R. Gross, The Rhetoric of Racial Profiling, in Social Con-
sciousness in Legal Decision Making 35, 43–44 (Richard L. Wiener et al. eds., 2007);
Lemos & Minzner, supra note 27, at 868–70.
154. See 18 U.S.C. § 981(e) (2012).
155. Lemos & Minzner, supra note 27, at 869, 895–98.
December 2015] Due Process for Cash Civil Forfeitures in Structuring Cases 473
which allows DOJ to keep forfeiture proceeds rather than require them to be
deposited in the general fund. This change encourages DOJ to use asset for-
feiture as a law enforcement tool more often.156 The results are clear. In
1985, the first year of reported revenue, the DOJ took in $27 million from
the proceeds of forfeited property.157 In 2008, the Assets Forfeiture Fund’s
net position—revenues from forfeited property minus expenses—exceeded
$1 billion.158 By 2013, the fund’s net position rose to $1.85 billion.159 But
DOJ may be overusing civil forfeiture, especially given that few cash seizure
cases lead to prosecution.160
Third, “the probable value of additional procedural safeguards is
high.”161 Both Krimstock and Smith pointed to state statutes that “provide an
early opportunity to challenge the retention of seized property” to illustrate
different possible procedures for handling civil forfeitures.162 Krimstock
noted a Florida statute that provides a postseizure hearing within ten days
after a claimant’s request.163 Smith noted an Arizona statute that allows
claimants to seek an order that requires the seizing agency to show cause.164
And, after Smith, Illinois amended its drug forfeiture statute to provide for a
postseizure hearing.165 Federal law includes no similar statutory provision to
challenge the detention of seized property.
Despite these concerns, then-Judge Sotomayor concluded in Krimstock
that the risk of erroneous deprivation narrowly weighed in favor of the gov-
ernment.166 In that case, forfeiture was based on driving while intoxicated;
officers are well trained in assessing a driver’s level of intoxication, so the
driver was most likely not innocent.167 But Simms reached the opposite con-
clusion. The court concluded that “there is an inherent risk of error when a
seizure is based [on] a traffic stop: namely, its validity rests solely on the
156. Id. at 868 (citing S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 191 (1983)).
157. Eric Moores, Note, Reforming the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act, 51 Ariz. L. Rev.
777, 783 (2009).
158. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Audit Div., Audit Report No. 09-19, Assets Forfeiture
Fund and Seized Asset Deposit Fund Annual Financial Statement Fiscal Year 2008, at
7 (2009), http://www.justice.gov/jmd/afp/01programaudit/fy2008/fy2008_afs_report.pdf.
159. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Audit Div., Audit Report No. 14-08, Audit of the Assets
Forfeiture Fund and Seized Asset Deposit Fund Annual Financial Statements Fiscal
Year 2013, at 7 (2014), http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/2014/a1408.pdf.
160. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
161. Simms v. District of Columbia, 872 F. Supp. 2d 90, 101 (D.D.C. 2012).
162. Smith v. City of Chicago, 524 F.3d 834, 838 (7th Cir. 2008), vacated as moot sub nom.
Alvarez v. Smith, 558 U.S. 87 (2009).
163. Krimstock v. Kelly, 306 F.3d 40, 54–55 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing Fla. Stat.
§ 932.703(2)(a)).
164. Smith, 524 F.3d at 838 (citing Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4310).
165. Edgeworth, supra note 16, at 106 (citing 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 550/12(c); then cit-
ing 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 150/3.5).
166. Krimstock, 306 F.3d at 64.
167. Id. at 62–63.
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arresting officer’s unreviewed probable cause determination.”168 In the case
of seized cash, documented examples of erroneous deprivations for innocent
owners, the overuse of seizures for alleged structuring, the government’s
strong pecuniary interest, and examples of other procedures combine to tilt
the second Mathews factor in favor of claimants of seized cash like Dehko,
Zaniewski, and Hinders.
3. Government Interest
The third Mathews factor weighs the government’s interest in maintain-
ing current procedures, including the burdens of implementing alternative
procedures.169 In this case, “[t]he question in the civil forfeiture context is
whether ex parte seizure is justified by a pressing need for prompt action.”170
First, the government has a legitimate interest in ensuring that cash is
not concealed, moved, or used for illegal activity before judgment.171 This is
the government’s “most compelling” interest.172 The real purpose of retain-
ing property is to prevent its use as an instrumentality in future criminal
activity when the “threat to the public [is] immediate.”173 In fact, many of
the reasons underlying the earliest civil forfeiture laws still apply to cash.174
Because cash is easier to hide—whether in offshore accounts or in Sgt.
Cortazzo’s safe-deposit box175—than a home or car, the rationale for forfei-
ture laws might be especially apt here. If law enforcement cannot retain
seized cash, courts may never have the chance to adjudicate the forfeiture.
168. Simms v. District of Columbia, 872 F. Supp. 2d 90, 101–02 (D.D.C. 2012).
169. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 319, 324 (1976).
170. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 56 (1993).
171. Id. at 56, 58.
172. See, e.g., Krimstock, 306 F.3d at 64 (addressing the government’s interest “to prevent a
vehicle from being sold or destroyed before a court can render judgment in future forfeiture
proceedings”).
173. Id. at 66 (noting “the examples of summary seizures during wartime, seizures of
contaminated food, and, formerly, the collection of taxes when the very existence of the gov-
ernment depended upon them”).
174. Until the seventeenth-century English Navigation Acts, “[i]f the owner was available,
the forfeiture evidently was imposed only upon confession or adjudication of his guilt.” James
R. Maxeiner, Note, Bane of American Forfeiture Law—Banished at Last?, 62 Cornell L. Rev.
768, 775 (1977). But the Navigation Acts provided for forfeiture of an entire ship involved in
smuggling contraband, even without the knowledge of the ship master or owner. Id. at 774.
The Acts’ strictness was meant to “strengthen England’s naval prowess.” Boudreaux & Pritch-
ard, supra note 50, at 95; see also Mitchell v. Torup, (1766) 145 Eng. Rep. 764 (Exch.) 766;
Park. 227, 232–33 (explaining how in rem forfeiture assisted “the increase of the navigation”).
With this background, the First Congress adopted civil forfeiture laws as a way to collect
important revenue for the fledgling republic. See Boudreaux & Pritchard, supra note 50, at
96–97. For customs, in rem “forfeiture was the government’s only means for collecting the
tax” because “[t]he owner of the goods was often beyond the Court’s in personam jurisdic-
tion.” Donald J. Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard, Innocence Lost: Bennis v. Michigan and the
Forfeiture Tradition, 61 Mo. L. Rev. 593, 620 (1996).
175. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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Because cash is so easily moved or concealed, the government’s interest
would likely outweigh other considerations in Mathews balancing for notice
or hearing before cash is seized. Here, the appropriate procedural safeguard
for seized cash is a postseizure, not a preseizure, hearing: giving the claimant
an opportunity to be heard and test the validity of the detention of cash after
federal agents seize it. A court can then turn to other procedures to ensure
the availability of cash for a forfeiture proceeding, such as appointing a con-
servator or receiver.176
Second, the Good Court noted the concern in another case that “imme-
diate seizure was necessary to establish the court’s jurisdiction over the
property.”177 The Court rejected that concern, however, due to the inability
to steal or hide a home and a court’s ability to prevent the sale of real
property.178
Finally, the government has an “interest in avoiding additional procedu-
ral safeguards.”179 But “due process always imposes some burden on a gov-
erning entity.”180 And as the Good Court concluded, “[r]equiring the
Government to postpone seizure until after an adversary hearing creates no
significant administrative burden.”181 The government must already show
probable cause to seize cash. The only difference now is that the government
must prove probable cause in a postseizure, adversarial hearing rather than
ex parte.
In sum, claimants have a strong interest in a postseizure hearing. Ex-
isting procedures do not adequately protect innocent owners during the
deprivation of cash, and other procedures are available. And the government
has a lesser interest in a postseizure—rather than preseizure—hearing, so
the private interests of the owner triumph. Thus, each Mathews factor
weighs toward requiring a postseizure hearing to test the validity of contin-
ued cash retention.
III. The Demands of Due Process
Adequate due process can take many forms.182 This Part considers possi-
ble alternatives for government actors to protect the interests of owners of
seized cash and avoid a constitutional problem. Section III.A presents
options for Congress to defeat the need for a constitutional remedy by
176. 18 U.S.C. § 983(j) (2012).
177. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 57 (1993) (citing Calero-
Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 679 (1974)).
178. Id. at 57–58.
179. Simms v. District of Columbia, 872 F. Supp. 2d 90, 103 (D.D.C. 2012).
180. Smith v. City of Chicago, 524 F.3d 834, 838 (7th Cir. 2008), vacated as moot sub nom.
Alvarez v. Smith, 558 U.S. 87 (2009).
181. Good, 510 U.S. at 59.
182. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 96 (1972) (“The nature and form of such prior
hearings, moreover, are legitimately open to many potential variations . . . .”); Krimstock v.
Kelly, 306 F.3d 40, 69 (2d Cir. 2002) (“There is no universal approach to satisfying the require-
ments of meaningful notice and opportunity to be heard in a situation such as this.”).
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providing additional safeguards that reduce the risk of erroneous depriva-
tion.183 In addition, the executive branch, through agencies like the IRS and
DOJ, can continue to enact policy changes in the civil forfeiture arena by
eschewing cash seizures entirely in structuring cases, but future administra-
tions can easily change those policies. Section III.B argues that, absent legis-
lative reforms, the temporary detention of seized cash requires a
constitutional remedy. Section III.B then discusses the characteristics of one
potential remedy: postseizure hearings. Thus—unless Congress amends fed-
eral law to provide better procedural alternatives—due process requires pro-
tection under Mathews for cash seizures in structuring cases.
A. Legislative and Executive Proposals
Commentators continue to criticize CAFRA for failing to protect prop-
erty owners, often on the grounds that the government’s burden of proof
remains too low, the innocent-owner defense is too limited, or law enforce-
ment’s financial incentives to seize property are still too powerful.184 A num-
ber of proposals could meet the demands of due process by reducing the risk
of erroneous deprivation. These include raising the government’s burden of
proof,185 eliminating seizing agencies’ pecuniary interests in the property
they seize,186 requiring proportionality between the forfeiture and the under-
lying offense,187 or even tailoring new procedures and burdens for different
types of forfeitures.188 Indeed, IRS seizure and forfeiture practices have
interested Congress and led to a subcommittee hearing on the issue.189
Member statements suggest a rare opportunity for bipartisanship.190
183. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 343 (1976) (considering “the fairness and
reliability of the existing pretermination procedures, and the probable value, if any, of addi-
tional procedural safeguards” as the second factor in civil due process balancing).
184. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
185. Barclay Thomas Johnson, Note, Restoring Civility—The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform
Act of 2000: Baby Steps Toward a More Civilized Civil Forfeiture System, 35 Ind. L. Rev. 1045,
1075–79 (2002); see also Fifth Amendment Integrity Restoration (FAIR) Act of 2015, S. 255,
H.R. 540, 114th Cong. § 2 (2015) (replacing proof by “a preponderance of the evidence” with
“clear and convincing evidence”).
186. See David Benjamin Ross, Note, Civil Forfeiture: A Fiction that Offends Due Process,
13 Regent U. L. Rev. 259, 270–75 (2000); see also S. 255, H.R. 540, § 3 (redirecting forfeiture
assets from the U.S. Department of Justice Assets Forfeiture Fund to the General Fund of the
Treasury of the United States).
187. Owen Sucoff, Note, From the Courthouse to the Police Station: Combating the Dual
Biases that Surround Federal Money-Laundering Asset Forfeiture, 46 New Eng. L. Rev. 93,
117–21 (2011).
188. Pimentel, supra note 47, at 54–59.
189. Protecting Small Businesses from IRS Abuse: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight
of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 114th Cong. (2015) (statement of Rep. Peter Roskam,
Chairman, Subcomm. on Oversight of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means), http://
waysandmeans.house.gov/roskam-opening-statement-protecting-small-businesses-from-irs-
abuse/.
190. According to Oversight Subcommittee Chairman Roskam, a Republican, “[t]here is
strong indication that the IRS has been involved in civil forfeiture that has hurt innocent
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Congress could look to state laws that offer more protection than federal
law to statutorily safeguard due process rights. For example, the Krimstock
court consulted a Florida statute to determine how New York City Code
could provide an opportunity to challenge government retention of seized
property.191 Upon seizure, the Florida law required authorities to give an
owner notice that she may request an adversarial hearing within fifteen days
after receiving notice.192 The Smith court turned to an Arizona statute to
show how Illinois could provide an opportunity to challenge retention of
seized property.193 Rather than providing a hearing, Arizona law required
authorities to show cause on an owner’s request.194 After Smith, Illinois pro-
vided for a postseizure hearing within fourteen days of a seizure.195 And in
April 2015, New Mexico restricted civil forfeiture to cases in which the
owner is convicted of a crime and clear and convincing evidence exists that
property is subject to forfeiture.196 These state policies, if adopted by Con-
gress, could reduce the risk of erroneous deprivation of property and thus
reduce the risk of a successful constitutional challenge.
Looking at the problem through the lens of prosecutorial discretion,
Congress could also consider reforming CAFRA’s attorney-fee provision.197
Under current law, a court can award attorney fees in any case in which the
claimant “substantially prevails.”198 But courts have held that a claimant
does not meet that standard if the government voluntarily dismisses the
case,199 leaving claimants like Dehko, Zaniewski, and Hinders ineligible for
attorney fees. Since the government is more likely to voluntarily dismiss a
forfeiture case than prosecute and lose, awarding fees even when the govern-
ment dismisses  cases would have a significant impact. Here, too, legislators
could look to state law for solutions. Three years after an influential Pulitzer
Prize-winning series in the Orlando Sentinel revealed systemic forfeiture
practices by Florida police along I-95,200 the Florida legislature enacted a law
people.” Bade, supra note 36. Representative Rangel, a Democrat, added, “[w]hether or not it
is within the law, it is wrong to, without any criminal evidence, seize somebody’s property.”
Id.
191. Krimstock v. Kelly, 306 F.3d 40, 54–55 (2d Cir. 2002).
192. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 932.703(2)(a) (West 2015).
193. Smith v. City of Chicago, 524 F.3d 834, 838 (7th Cir. 2008), vacated as moot sub nom.
Alvarez v. Smith, 558 U.S. 87 (2009).
194. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4310 (West 2010).
195. 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 150/3.5 (2012); see also Edgeworth, supra note 16, at 106
(“The State of Illinois has subsequently [after Smith] amended the state drug forfeiture statute,
adding a new provision for a contested probable cause hearing within 14 days of the seizure.”);
cf. 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 550/12(c) (2012).
196. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-27-4 (LexisNexis 2014).
197. 28 U.S.C. § 2465(b)(1)(A) (2012).
198. Id. § (b)(1).
199. 1 Smith, supra note 60, ¶ 10.08(2).
200. Jeff Brazil & Steve Berry, Tainted Cash or Easy Money?, Orlando Sentinel (June 14,
1992), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/1992-06-14/news/9206131060_1_seizures-kea-drug-
squad; see also Hyde, supra note 45, at 38–40 (discussing the investigation’s findings).
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that awards up to $1,000 in attorney fees to claimants if a seizing agency fails
to show probable cause for forfeiture at a preliminary hearing.201 Strength-
ening attorney fees could disincentivize prosecutors from seizing Dehko’s,
Zaniewski’s, and Hinders’s bank accounts only to voluntarily dismiss the
civil forfeiture actions later.
Outside Congress, the executive branch has recently taken action to curb
abuses in civil asset forfeiture. For example, the IRS announced that it would
stop seeking the forfeiture of funds seized for alleged structuring without
undefined “exceptional circumstances.”202 In January 2015, DOJ suspended
a program that allowed use of federal law to forfeit assets seized by state and
local law enforcement.203 And in March, DOJ announced a new policy re-
quiring prosecutors to develop probable cause of additional federal criminal
activity, which is then subject to supervisor approval.204 But these policies
still allow federal agents to seize cash for alleged structuring under federal
law. And the constitutional problem is not eliminated when future executive
branch officials can simply reverse those policies.
Legislative reforms might provide adequate procedures to meet the de-
mands of due process. But they require action. Without such reforms, the
process owed to claimants of seized cash in structuring cases presents courts
with a constitutional problem.
B. Judicial Remedies
Once a court finds that Mathews balancing weighs in favor of a claimant
of seized cash, it must craft a constitutional remedy. The question that re-
mains is what process is due to claimants. For example, under Gerstein v.
Pugh, the extended restraint of liberty in a criminal arrest requires a judicial
determination of probable cause—which can occur in an ex parte proceed-
ing.205 In civil forfeiture, however, the Supreme Court has counseled that
“[t]he practice of ex parte seizure . . . creates an unacceptable risk of error”
for innocent owners.206 Moreover, the Court concluded that the deprivation
of property pending the outcome of a civil forfeiture proceeding must meet
201. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 932.704(10) (West 2015); see also Michael Griffin, Forfeiture Re-
form Bill Becomes Law, Orlando Sentinel (June 14, 1995), http://articles.orlandosentinel
.com/1995-06-14/news/9506140140_1_seize-property-law-enforcement-requires-law.
202. See Statement of Richard Weber, Chief of I.R.S. Criminal Investigation, supra note 32.
203. Order from Attorney Gen. Eric Holder, Prohibition on Certain Federal Adoptions of
Seizures by State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies (Jan. 16, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/
sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/01/16/attorney_general_order_prohibit
ing_adoptions.pdf; see also Robert O’Harrow Jr. et al., Holder Limits Seized-Asset Sharing Pro-
cess that Split Billions with Local, State Police, Wash. Post (Jan. 16, 2015), http://www.washing
tonpost.com/investigations/holder-ends-seized-asset-sharing-process-that-split-billions-with-
local-state-police/2015/01/16/0e7ca058-99d4-11e4-bcfb-059ec7a93ddc_story.html?hpid=z1.
204. Memorandum for Heads of Department Components U.S. Attorneys from Attorney
Gen. Eric Holder, supra note 34.
205. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
206. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 55 (1993).
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both Fourth Amendment seizure and Fifth Amendment due process re-
quirements.207 To meet these constitutional requirements, courts can simply
provide a postseizure, adversarial probable cause hearing.
Krimstock hearings provide insight into the appropriate process for
claimants of seized cash. After several appeals and remands testing the need
to protect law enforcement interests,208 a Krimstock hearing provides an ad-
versarial process in which the claimant can contest that probable cause exists
on three grounds: (1) whether probable cause existed for the offense under-
lying the forfeiture, (2) whether the government is likely to prevail in a for-
feiture action, and (3) whether the government needs to detain the cash
pending the forfeiture action.209 The hearing is not weighed down by all of
the procedural safeguards that come with a trial.210 As long as the claimant
can meaningfully test whether probable cause exists, due process is satisfied.
The hearing need be no more than a postseizure, adversarial Gerstein hear-
ing. Because law enforcement must already demonstrate probable cause to
seize property, the additional burden on law enforcement is small.
The question remains whether a Krimstock hearing for claimants of
seized cash would actually benefit claimants in practice. After all, probable
cause is an amorphous standard,211 and prosecutors tend to easily meet the
low bar required for a Gerstein hearing. Prosecutors will be able to present
enough evidence that cash is subject to forfeiture by probable cause in many,
probably most, cases. But the low rate of prosecution in criminal structuring
cases after cash seizures might suggest otherwise.212
Moreover, critics ignore the reputational costs prosecutors would pay by
requesting the continued detention of seized cash in weak cases. Providing
Krimstock hearings for most cash seizures would bring the same prosecutors
207. Id. at 52.
208. In Krimstock, the Second Circuit held “that, at a minimum, the hearing must enable
claimants to test the probable validity of continued deprivation” of the property. Krimstock v.
Kelly (Krimstock I), 306 F.3d 40, 69 (2d Cir. 2002). But, on remand to the district court to
create a “Krimstock hearing,” for the first time the city raised the issue of retaining seized
property as arrest evidence—which conflicted with the Second Circuit’s remand to develop a
procedure allowing claimants to challenge vehicles’ detention. Jones v. Kelly (Krimstock II), 378
F.3d 198, 200 (2d Cir. 2004). The district court then held a hearing on law enforcement con-
cerns, and the Second Circuit upheld the new order. Krimstock v. Kelly (Krimstock III), 464
F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2006).
209. Third Amended Order & Judgment, Krimstock v. Kelly (Krimstock IV), 506 F. Supp.
2d 249 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (No. 99 Civ. 12041 (HB)), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82612, at *2.
210. See Krimstock IV, 506 F. Supp. 2d at 256 (“Although a ‘full-dress adversarial hearing’
is not required to test the District Attorney’s initial application to retain the vehicle, given the
deprivation of a vehicle here—frequently, the only way in which the claimant can earn a
living—claimants must be provided at some point with some opportunity to be heard.”).
211. Cf., e.g., Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983) (“As the Court frequently has
remarked, probable cause is a flexible, common-sense standard. . . . [I]t does not demand any
showing that that such a belief be correct or more likely true than false. A ‘practical, nontech-
nical’ probability that incriminating evidence is involved is all that is required.”).
212. See Dewan, supra note 23.
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before the same magistrates over and over again, putting prosecutors’ repu-
tations in play. If prosecutors repeatedly ask magistrates to retain seized cash
and then voluntarily dismiss cases—as with Dehko, Zaniewski, and Hin-
ders—or lose the forfeiture actions, the magistrates will be more skeptical of
government claims in future Krimstock hearings. Skeptical magistrates, in
turn, incentivize prosecutors to pursue only stronger cases, resulting in less
forfeiture. Even if certain legislative reforms would more rigorously protect
claimants’ interests, due process requires at least Krimstock hearings for cash
seizures in structuring cases. And, as this Note demonstrates, in the absence
of congressional action, courts must provide Krimstock hearings to protect
innocent owners from improper government seizures.
Conclusion
This Note demonstrates that seizing and detaining cash in structuring
cases violates due process. Under current law, cash seizures do not have ade-
quate procedural safeguards. And, at least in structuring cases, the private
interest in cash seizures likely outweighs the government interest. With no
legislative reforms pending, courts should not wait for Congress to craft al-
ternative procedures for claimants of seized cash to test the validity of the
detention. Future innocent claimants like Terry Dehko, Mark Zaniewski,
Carole Hinders, and Jeff Cortazzo could suffer less harm if given the oppor-
tunity to make their case in an adversarial hearing before a magistrate—a
hearing that due process demands.
